Improving Black-box Adversarial Attacks with a Transfer-based Prior by Cheng, Shuyu et al.
Improving Black-box Adversarial Attacks with a
Transfer-based Prior
Shuyu Cheng∗, Yinpeng Dong∗, Tianyu Pang, Hang Su, Jun Zhu†
Dept. of Comp. Sci. and Tech., BNRist Center, State Key Lab for Intell. Tech. & Sys.,
Institute for AI, THBI Lab, Tsinghua University, Beijing, 100084, China
{chengsy18, dyp17, pty17}@mails.tsinghua.edu.cn, {suhangss, dcszj}@mail.tsinghua.edu.cn
Abstract
We consider the black-box adversarial setting, where the adversary has to gen-
erate adversarial perturbations without access to the target models to compute
gradients. Previous methods tried to approximate the gradient either by using a
transfer gradient of a surrogate white-box model, or based on the query feedback.
However, these methods often suffer from low attack success rates or poor query
efficiency since it is non-trivial to estimate the gradient in a high-dimensional space
with limited information. To address these problems, we propose a prior-guided
random gradient-free (P-RGF) method to improve black-box adversarial attacks,
which takes the advantage of a transfer-based prior and the query information
simultaneously. The transfer-based prior given by the gradient of a surrogate model
is appropriately integrated into our algorithm by an optimal coefficient derived by
a theoretical analysis. Extensive experiments demonstrate that our method requires
much fewer queries to attack black-box models with higher success rates compared
with the alternative state-of-the-art methods.
1 Introduction
Although deep neural networks (DNNs) have achieved significant success on various tasks [12], they
have been shown to be vulnerable to adversarial examples [2, 33, 13], which are crafted to fool the
models by modifying normal examples with human imperceptible perturbations. Many efforts have
been devoted to studying the generation of adversarial examples, which is crucial to identify the
weaknesses of deep learning algorithms [33, 1], serve as a surrogate to evaluate robustness [5], and
consequently contribute to the design of robust deep learning models [24].
In general, adversarial attacks can be categorized into white-box attacks and black-box attacks. In
the white-box setting, the adversary has full access to the model, and can use various gradient-based
methods [13, 20, 5, 24] to generate adversarial examples. In the more challenging black-box setting,
the adversary has no or limited knowledge about the model, and crafts adversarial examples without
any gradient information. The black-box setting is more practical in many real-world situations.
Many methods [30, 6, 3, 7, 18, 27, 35, 19, 9] have been proposed to perform black-box adversarial
attacks. A common idea is to use an approximate gradient instead of the true gradient for crafting
adversarial examples. The approximate gradient could be either the gradient of a surrogate model
(termed as transfer-based attacks) or numerically estimated by the zeroth-order optimization methods
(termed as query-based attacks). In transfer-based attacks, adversarial examples generated for a
different model are probable to remain adversarial for the target model due to the transferability [29].
Although various methods [7, 23, 8] have been introduced to improve the transferability, the attack
success rate is still unsatisfactory. The reason is that there lacks an adjustment procedure in transfer-
based attacks when the gradient of the surrogate model points to a non-adversarial region of the
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target model. In query-based adversarial attacks, the gradient can be estimated by various methods,
such as finite difference [6, 27], random gradient estimation [35], and natural evolution strategy [18].
These methods usually result in a higher attack success rate compared with the transfer-based attack
methods [6, 27], but they require a tremendous number of queries to perform a successful attack. The
inefficiency mainly comes from the underutilization of priors, since the current methods are nearly
optimal to estimate the gradient [19].
To address the aforementioned problems and improve black-box attacks, we propose a prior-guided
random gradient-free (P-RGF) method to utilize the transfer-based prior for query-efficient black-
box attacks under the gradient estimation framework. The transfer-based prior is given by the gradient
of a surrogate white-box model, which contains abundant prior knowledge of the true gradient. Our
method provides a gradient estimate by querying the target model with random samples that are biased
towards the transfer gradient and acquiring the corresponding loss values. We provide a theoretical
analysis on deriving the optimal coefficient, which controls the strength of the transfer gradient.
Our method is also flexible to integrate other forms of prior information. As a concrete example,
we incorporate the commonly used data-dependent prior [19] into our algorithm along with the
transfer-based prior. Extensive experiments demonstrate that our method significantly outperforms
the previous state-of-the-art methods in terms of black-box attack success rate and query efficiency,
which verifies the superiority of our method for black-box adversarial attacks.
2 Background
In this section, we review the background and the related work on black-box adversarial attacks.
2.1 Adversarial setup
Given a classifier C(x) and an input-label pair (x, y), the goal of attacks is to generate an adversarial
example xadv that is misclassified while the distance between the adversarial input and the normal
input measured by the `p norm is smaller than a preset threshold  as
C(xadv) 6= y, s.t. ‖xadv − x‖p ≤ . (1)
Note that this corresponds to the untargeted attack. We present our framework and algorithm based
on the untargeted attack for clarity, while the extension to the targeted one is straightforward.
An adversarial example can be generated by solving the constrained optimization problem as
xadv = arg max
x′:‖x′−x‖p≤
f(x′, y), (2)
where f is a loss function on top of the classifier C(x), e.g., the cross-entropy loss. Many gradient-
based methods [13, 20, 5, 24] have been proposed to solve this optimization problem. The state-of-
the-art projected gradient descent (PGD) [24] iteratively generates adversarial examples as
xadvt+1 = ΠBp(x,)(x
adv
t + η · gt), (3)
where Π is the projection operation, Bp(x, ) is the `p ball centered at x with radius , η is the step
size, and gt is the normalized gradient under the `p norm, e.g., gt =
∇xf(xadvt ,y)
‖∇xf(xadvt ,y)‖2 under the `2
norm, and gt = sign(∇xf(xadvt , y)) under the `∞ norm. This method requires full access to the
gradient of the target model, which is designed under the white-box attack setting.
2.2 Black-box attacks
The direct access to the model gradient is unrealistic in many real-world applications, where we
need to perform attacks in the black-box manner. We can still adopt the PGD method to generate
adversarial examples, except that the true gradient∇xf(x, y) is usually replaced by an approximate
gradient. Black-box attacks can be roughly divided into transfer-based attacks and query-based attacks.
Transfer-based attacks adopt the gradient of a surrogate white-box model to generate adversarial
examples, which are probable to fool the black-box model due to the transferability [30, 23, 7].
Query-based attacks estimate the gradient by the zeroth-order optimization methods, when the loss
values could be accessed through queries. Chen et al. [6] propose to use the symmetric difference
quotient [21] to estimate the gradient at each coordinate as
gˆi =
f(x+ σei, y)− f(x− σei, y)
2σ
≈ ∂f(x, y)
∂xi
, (4)
2
where σ is a small constant, and ei is the i-th unit basis vector. Although query-efficient mechanisms
have been developed [6, 27], the coordinate-wise gradient estimation inherently results in the query
complexity being proportional to the input dimension D, which is prohibitively large with high-
dimensional input space, e.g., D ≈ 270,000 for ImageNet [31]. To improve query efficiency, the
approximated gradient gˆ can be estimated by the random gradient-free (RGF) method [26, 11, 10] as
gˆ =
1
q
q∑
i=1
gˆi, where gˆi =
f(x+ σui, y)− f(x, y)
σ
· ui, (5)
where {ui}qi=1 are the random vectors independently sampled from a distribution P on RD, and
σ is the parameter to control the sampling variance. It is noted that gˆi → u>i ∇xf(x, y) · ui when
σ → 0, which is nearly an unbiased estimator of the gradient [10] when E[uiu>i ] = I. gˆ is the
average estimation over q random directions to reduce the variance. The natural evolution strategy
(NES) [18] is another variant of Eq. (5), which conducts the antithetic sampling over a Gaussian
distribution. Ilyas et al. [19] show that these methods are nearly optimal to estimate the gradient, but
their query efficiency could be improved by incorporating informative priors. They identify the time
and data-dependent priors for black-box attacks. Different from the alternative methods, our proposed
transfer-based prior is more effective as shown in the experiments. Moreover, the transfer-based
prior can also be used together with other priors. We demonstrate the flexibility of our algorithm by
incorporating the commonly used data-dependent prior as an example.
2.3 Black-box attacks based on both transferability and queries
There are also several works that adopt both the transferability of adversarial examples and the model
queries for black-box attacks. Papernot et al. [30, 29] train a local substitute model to mimic the
black-box model with a synthetic dataset, in which the labels are given by the black-box model
through queries. Then the black-box model is attacked by the adversarial examples generated for the
substitute model based on the transferability. A meta-model [28] can reverse-engineer the black-box
model and predict its attributes (such as architecture, optimization procedure, and training data)
through a sequence of queries. Given the predicted attributes of the black-box model, the attacker
can find similar surrogate models, which are better to craft transferable adversarial examples against
the black-box model. These methods all use queries to obtain knowledge of the black-box model,
and train/find surrogate models to generate adversarial examples, with the purpose of improving the
transferability. However, we do not optimize the surrogate model, but focus on utilizing the gradient
of a fixed surrogate model to obtain a more accurate gradient estimate.
A recent work [4] also uses the gradient of a surrogate model to improve the efficiency of query-based
black-box attacks. This method focuses on a different attack scenario, where the model only provides
the hard-label outputs, but we consider the setting where the loss values could be accessed. Moreover,
this method controls the strength of the transfer gradient by a preset hyperparameter, but we obtain
its optimal value through a theoretical analysis based on the gradient estimation framework. It’s
worth mentioning that a similar but independent work [25] also uses surrogate gradients to improve
zeroth-order optimization, but they did not apply their method to black-box adversarial attacks.
3 Methodology
In this section, we first introduce the gradient estimation framework. Then we propose the prior-
guided random gradient-free (P-RGF) algorithm. We further incorporate the data-dependent prior [19]
into our algorithm. We also provide an alternative algorithm for the same purpose in Appendix B.
3.1 Gradient estimation framework
The key challenge in black-box adversarial attacks is to estimate the gradient of a model, which can
be used to conduct gradient-based attacks. In this paper, we aim to estimate the gradient∇xf(x, y)
of the black-box model f more accurately to improve black-box attacks. We denote the gradient
∇xf(x, y) by∇f(x) in the following for simplicity. We assume that ∇f(x) 6= 0 in this paper. The
objective of gradient estimation is to find the best estimator, which approximates the true gradient
∇f(x) by reaching the minimum value of the loss function as
gˆ∗ = arg min
gˆ∈G
L(gˆ), (6)
3
where gˆ is a gradient estimator given by any estimation algorithm, G is the set of all possible gradient
estimators, and L(gˆ) is a loss function to measure the performance of the estimator gˆ. Specifically,
we let the loss function of the gradient estimator gˆ be
L(gˆ) = min
b≥0
E‖∇f(x)− bgˆ‖22, (7)
where the expectation is taken over the randomness of the estimation algorithm to obtain gˆ. The
loss L(gˆ) is the minimum expected squared `2 distance between the true gradient ∇f(x) and scaled
estimator bgˆ. The previous work [35] also uses the expected squared `2 distance E‖∇f(x)− gˆ‖22 as
the loss function, which is similar to ours. However, the value of this loss function will change with
different magnitude of the estimator gˆ. In generating adversarial examples, the gradient is usually
normalized [13, 24], such that the direction of the gradient estimator, instead of the magnitude, will
affect the performance of attacks. Thus, we incorporate a scaling factor b in Eq. (7) and minimize the
error w.r.t. b, which can neglect the impact of the magnitude on the loss of the estimator gˆ.
3.2 Prior-guided random gradient-free method
In this section, we present the prior-guided random gradient-free (P-RGF) method, which is a variant
of the random gradient-free (RGF) method. Recall that in RGF, the gradient can be estimated via
a set of random vectors {ui}qi=1 as in Eq. (5) with q being the number of random vectors. Directly
using RGF without prior information will result in poor query efficiency as shown in our experiments.
In our method, we propose to sample the random vectors that are biased towards the transfer gradient,
to fully exploit the prior information.
Let v be the normalized transfer gradient of a surrogate model such that ‖v‖2 = 1, and the cosine
similarity between the transfer gradient and the true gradient be
α = v>∇f(x) with ∇f(x) = ‖∇f(x)‖−12 ∇f(x), (8)
where ∇f(x) is the `2 normalization of the true gradient ∇f(x).1 We assume that α ≥ 0 without
loss of generality, since we can reassign v ← −v when α < 0. Although the true value of α is
unknown, we could estimate it efficiently, which will be introduced in Sec. 3.3.
For the RGF estimator gˆ in Eq. (5), we further assume that the sampling distribution P is defined on
the unit hypersphere in the D-dimensional space, such that the random vectors {ui}qi=1 drawn fromP satisfy ‖ui‖2 = 1. Then, we can represent the loss of the RGF estimator by the following theorem.
Theorem 1. (Proof in Appendix A.1) If f is differentiable at x, the loss of the RGF estimator gˆ is
lim
σ→0
L(gˆ) = ‖∇f(x)‖22 −
(∇f(x)>C∇f(x))2
(1− 1q )∇f(x)>C2∇f(x) + 1q∇f(x)>C∇f(x)
, (9)
where σ is the sampling variance, C = E[uiu>i ] with ui being the random vector, ‖ui‖2 = 1, and q
is the number of random vectors as in Eq. (5).
Given the definition of C, it needs to satisfy two constraints: (1) it should be positive semi-definite;
(2) its trace should be 1 since Tr(C) = E[Tr(uiu>i )] = E[u>i ui] = 1. It is noted from Theorem 1
that we can minimize L(gˆ) by optimizing C, i.e., we can achieve an optimal gradient estimator by
carefully sampling the random vectors ui, yielding an query-efficient adversarial attack.
Specifically,C can be decomposed as
∑D
i=1 λiviv
>
i , where {λi}Di=1 and {vi}Di=1 are the eigenvalues
and orthonormal eigenvectors of C, and
∑D
i=1 λi = 1. In our method, since we propose to bias
ui towards v to exploit its prior information, we can specify an eigenvector to be v, and let the
corresponding eigenvalue be a tunable coefficient. For the other eigenvalues, we set them to be equal
since we do not have any prior knowledge about the other eigenvectors. In this case, we let
C = λvv> +
1− λ
D − 1(I− vv
>), (10)
where λ ∈ [0, 1] controls the strength of the transfer gradient that the random vectors {ui}qi=1 are
biased towards. We can easily construct a random vector with unit length while satisfying Eq. (10)
(proof in Appendix A.2) as
ui =
√
λ · v +√1− λ · (I− vv>)ξi, (11)
1 We will use e to denote the `2 normalization of a vector e in this paper.
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Algorithm 1 Prior-guided random gradient-free (P-RGF) method
Input: The black-box model f ; input x and label y; the normalized transfer gradient v; sampling variance σ;
number of queries q; input dimension D.
Output: Estimate of the gradient∇f(x).
1: Estimate the cosine similarity α = v>∇f(x) (detailed in Sec. 3.3);
2: Calculate λ∗ according to Eq. (12) given α, q, and D;
3: if λ∗ = 1 then
4: return v;
5: end if
6: gˆ ← 0;
7: for i = 1 to q do
8: Sample ξi from the uniform distribution on the D-dimensional unit hypersphere;
9: ui =
√
λ∗ · v +√1− λ∗ · (I− vv>)ξi;
10: gˆ ← gˆ + f(x+ σui, y)− f(x, y)
σ
· ui;
11: end for
12: return∇f(x)← 1
q
gˆ.
where ξi is sampled uniformly from the unit hypersphere. Hereby, the problem turns to optimizing λ
that minimizes L(gˆ). The previous work [35] can also be categorized as a special case of our method
when λ = 1D and C =
1
D I, such that the random vectors are drawn from the uniform distribution
on the hypersphere. When λ ∈ [0, 1D ), it indicates that the transfer gradient is worse than a random
vector, so we are encouraged to search in other directions by using a small λ. To find the optimal λ,
we plug Eq. (10) into Eq. (9), and obtain the closed-form solution (proof in Appendix A.3) as
λ∗ =

0 if α2 ≤ 1
D + 2q − 2
(1− α2)(α2(D + 2q − 2)− 1)
2α2Dq − α4D(D + 2q − 2)− 1 if
1
D + 2q − 2 < α
2 <
2q − 1
D + 2q − 2
1 if α2 ≥ 2q − 1
D + 2q − 2
. (12)
Remark. It can be proven (in Appendix A.4) that λ∗ is a monotonically increasing function of α2,
and a monotonically decreasing function of q (when α2 > 1D ). It means that a larger α or a smaller
q (when the transfer gradient is not worse than a random vector) would result in a larger λ∗, which
makes sense since we tend to rely on the transfer gradient more when (1) it approximates the true
gradient better; (2) the number of queries is not enough to provide much gradient information.
We summarize the P-RGF method in Algorithm 1. Note that when λ∗ = 1, we directly return the
transfer gradient as the estimate of∇f(x), which can save many queries.
3.3 Estimation of cosine similarity
To complete our algorithm, we also need to estimate α = v>∇f(x) = v>∇f(x)‖∇f(x)‖2 , where v is the
normalized transfer gradient. Note that the inner product v>∇f(x) can be easily estimated by the
finite difference method
v>∇f(x) ≈ f(x+ σv, y)− f(x, y)
σ
, (13)
using a small σ. Hence, the problem is reduced to estimating ‖∇f(x)‖2.
Suppose that it is allowed to conduct S queries to estimate ‖∇f(x)‖2. We first draw a different set of
S random vectors {ws}Ss=1 independently and uniformly from the D-dimensional unit hypersphere,
and then estimate w>s ∇f(x) using Eq. (13). Suppose that we have a r-degree homogeneous function
g of S variables, i.e., g(az) = arg(z) where a ∈ R and z ∈ RS , then we have
g
(
W>∇f(x)) = ‖∇f(x)‖r2 · g(W>∇f(x)), (14)
where W is the collection of the random vectors as W = [w1, ..., wS ]. In this case, the norm of
the gradient ‖∇f(x)‖2 could be computed easily if both g
(
W>∇f(x)) and g(W>∇f(x)) are
available. Note that g
(
W>∇f(x)) can be calculated since each w>s ∇f(x) is available.
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However, it is non-trivial to obtain the value ofw>s ∇f(x) as well as the function value g
(
W>∇f(x)).
Nevertheless, we note that the distribution of w>s ∇f(x) is the same regardless of the direction of
∇f(x), thus we can compute the expectation of the function value E[g(W>∇f(x))]. Based on
that, we use g(W
>∇f(x))
E[g(W>∇f(x))] as an unbiased estimator of ‖∇f(x)‖
r
2. In particular, we choose g as
g(z) = 1S
∑S
s=1 z
2
s . Then r = 2, and we have
E
[
g
(
W>∇f(x))] = E[(w>1 ∇f(x))2] = ∇f(x)>E[w1w>1 ]∇f(x) = 1D. (15)
By plugging Eq. (15) into Eq. (14), we can estimate the gradient norm by
‖∇f(x)‖2 ≈
√√√√D
S
S∑
s=1
(w>s ∇f(x))2 ≈
√√√√D
S
S∑
s=1
(f(x+ σws, y)− f(x, y)
σ
)2
. (16)
To save queries, we estimate the gradient norm periodically instead of in every iteration, since usually
it does not change very fast in the optimization process.
3.4 Incorporating the data-dependent prior
The proposed P-RGF method is generally flexible to integrate other priors. As a concrete example, we
incorporate the commonly used data-dependent prior [19] along with the transfer-based prior into our
algorithm. The data-dependent prior is proposed to reduce query complexity, which suggests that we
can utilize the structure of the inputs to reduce the input-space dimension without sacrificing much
estimation accuracy. This idea has also been adopted in several works [6, 35, 14, 4]. We observe that
many works restrict the adversarial perturbations to lie in a linear subspace of the input space, which
allows the application of our theoretical framework.
Consider the RGF estimator in Eq. (5). To leverage the data-dependent prior, suppose ui = Vξi,
where V = [v1, v2, ..., vd] is a D × d matrix (d < D), {vj}dj=1 is an orthonormal basis in the
d-dimensional subspace of the input space, and ξi is a random vector sampled from the d-dimensional
unit hypersphere. When ξi is sampled from the uniform distribution, C = 1d
∑d
i=1 viv
>
i .
Specifically, we focus on the data-dependent prior in [19]. In this method, the random vector ξi drawn
in Rd is up-sampled to ui in RD by the nearest neighbor algorithm, where d < D. The orthonormal
basis {vj}dj=1 can be obtained by first up-sampling the standard basis in Rd with the same method
and then applying normalization.
Now we consider incorporating the data-dependent prior into our algorithm. Similar to Eq. (10),
we let one eigenvector of C be v to exploit the transfer-based prior, and the others are given by the
orthonormal basis in the subspace to exploit the data-dependent prior, as
C = λvv> +
1− λ
d
d∑
i=1
viv
>
i . (17)
By plugging Eq. (17) into Eq. (9), we can also obtain the optimal λ (proof in Appendix A.5) as
λ∗ =

0 if α2 ≤ A
2
d+ 2q − 2
A2(A2 − α2(d+ 2q − 2))
A4 + α4d2 − 2A2α2(q + dq − 1) if
A2
d+ 2q − 2 < α
2 <
A2(2q − 1)
d
1 if α2 ≥ A
2(2q − 1)
d
, (18)
where A2 =
∑d
i=1(v
>
i ∇f(x))2. Note that A should also be estimated. We use a similar method to
the one for estimating α in Sec. 3.3, which is provided in Appendix C.
The remaining problem is to construct a random vector ui satisfying E[uiu>i ] = C, with C defined
in Eq. (17). In general, it is difficult since v is not orthogonal to the subspace. To address this issue,
we sample ui in a way that E[uiu>i ] is a good approximation of C (explanation in Appendix A.6),
which is similar to Eq. (11) as
ui =
√
λ · v +√1− λ · (I− vv>)Vξi, (19)
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Figure 1: (a) The crafted adversarial examples for the Inception-v3 [34] model by RGF and our P-RGF w.r.t.
number of queries. We show the cross-entropy loss of each image. The images in the green boxes are successfully
misclassified, while those in the red boxes are not. (b) The estimation error of gradient norm with different S.
(c) The average cosine similarity between the estimated gradient and the true gradient. The estimate is given
by our method with fixed λ and optimal λ, respectively. (d) The average λ∗ across attack iterations. (e) The
average cosine similarity between the transfer and the true gradients, and that between the estimated and the true
gradients, across attack iterations.
where ξi is sampled uniformly from the d-dimensional unit hypersphere.
Our algorithm with the data-dependent prior is similar to Algorithm 1. We first estimate α and A,
and then calculate λ∗ by Eq. (18). If λ∗ = 1, we use the transfer gradient v as the estimate. If not,
we sample q random vectors by Eq. (19) and obtain the gradient estimation by Eq. (5).
4 Experiments
In this section, we present the experimental results to demonstrate the effectiveness of the proposed
method on attacking black-box classifiers.2 We perform untargeted attacks under both the `2 and `∞
norms on the ImageNet dataset [31]. We choose 1,000 images randomly from the validation set for
evaluation. Due to the space limitation, we leave the results based on the `∞ norm in Appendix D.
The results for both norms are consistent. For all experiments, we use the ResNet-152 model [17] as
the surrogate model to generate the transfer gradient. We apply the PGD algorithm [24] to generate
adversarial examples with the estimated gradient given by each method. We set the perturbation size
as  =
√
0.001 ·D and the learning rate as η = 2 in PGD under the `2 norm, with images in [0, 1].
4.1 Performance of gradient estimation
In this section, we conduct several experiments to show the performance of gradient estimation. All
experiments in this section are performed on the Inception-v3 [34] model.
First, we show the performance of gradient norm estimation in Sec. 3.3. The gradient norm (or cosine
similarity) is easier to estimate than the true gradient since it’s a scalar value. Fig. 1(b) shows the esti-
mation error of the gradient norm, defined as the (normalized) RMSE—
√
E
( ̂‖∇f(x)‖2−‖∇f(x)‖2
‖∇f(x)‖2
)2
,
w.r.t. the number of queries S, where ‖∇f(x)‖2 is the true norm and ̂‖∇f(x)‖2 is the estimated one.
We choose S = 10 in all experiments to reduce the number of queries while the estimation error is
2Our code is available at: https://github.com/thu-ml/Prior-Guided-RGF.
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Table 1: The experimental results of black-box attacks against Inception-v3, VGG-16, and ResNet-50 under
the `2 norm. We report the attack success rate (ASR) and the average number of queries (AVG. Q) needed to
generate an adversarial example over successful attacks.
Methods Inception-v3 VGG-16 ResNet-50ASR AVG. Q ASR AVG. Q ASR AVG. Q
NES [18] 95.5% 1718 98.7% 1081 98.4% 969
BanditsT [19] 92.4% 1560 94.0% 584 96.2% 1076
BanditsTD [19] 97.2% 874 94.9% 278 96.8% 512
AutoZoom [35] 85.4% 2443 96.2% 1589 94.8% 2065
RGF 97.7% 1309 99.8% 749 99.6% 673
P-RGF (λ = 0.5) 96.5% 1119 97.8% 710 98.7% 635
P-RGF (λ = 0.05) 97.8% 1021 99.7% 624 99.3% 511
P-RGF (λ∗) 98.1% 745 99.6% 331 99.6% 265
RGFD 99.1% 910 100.0% 372 99.7% 429
P-RGFD (λ = 0.5) 98.2% 1047 99.7% 634 99.5% 552
P-RGFD (λ = 0.05) 99.1% 754 99.9% 359 99.8% 379
P-RGFD (λ∗) 99.1% 649 99.8% 250 99.6% 232
 
 ⇤
 
 ⇤
 
 ⇤
(a) Inception-v3 (b) VGG-16 (c) ResNet-50
Figure 2: We show the average number of queries per successful image at any desired success rate.
acceptable. We also estimate the gradient norm every 10 attack iterations in all experiments to reduce
the number of queries, since usually its value is relatively stable in the optimization process.
Second, we verify the effectiveness of the derived optimal λ (i.e., λ∗) in Eq. (12) for gradient
estimation, compared with any fixed λ ∈ [0, 1]. We perform attacks against Inception-v3 using P-
RGF with λ∗, and calculate the cosine similarity between the estimated gradient and the true gradient.
We calculate λ∗ using the estimated α in Sec. 3.3 instead of its true value. Meanwhile, along the
PGD updates, we also use fixed λ to get gradient estimates, and calculate the corresponding cosine
similarities. Note that λ∗ does not correspond to any fixed value, since it varies during iterations.
The average cosine similarities of different values of λ are shown in Fig. 1(c). It can be observed
that when a suitable value of λ is chosen, the proposed P-RGF provides a better gradient estimate
than both the original RGF method with uniform distribution (when λ = 1D ≈ 0) and the transfer
gradient (when λ = 1). Adopting λ∗ brings further improvement upon any fixed λ, demonstrating
the applicability of our theoretical framework.
Finally, we show the average λ∗ over all images w.r.t. attack iterations in Fig. 1(d). It shows that λ∗
decreases along with the iterations. Fig. 1(e) shows the average cosine similarity between the transfer
and the true gradients, and that between the estimated and the true gradients, across iterations. The
results show that the transfer gradient is useful at beginning, and becomes less useful along with the
iterations. However, the estimated gradient can remain higher cosine similarity with the true gradient,
which facilitates the adversarial attacks consequently. The results also prove that we need to use the
adaptive λ∗ in different attack iterations.
4.2 Results of black-box attacks on normal models
In this section, we perform attacks against three normally trained models, which are Inception-v3 [34],
VGG-16 [32], and ResNet-50 [16]. We compare the proposed prior-guided random gradient-free
(P-RGF) method with two baseline methods. The first is the original RGF method with uniform
sampling. The second is the P-RGF method with a fixed λ, which is set to 0.5 or 0.05. In these
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Table 2: The experimental results of black-box attacks against JPEG compression [15], randomization [37], and
guided denoiser [22] under the `2 norm. We report the attack success rate (ASR) and the average number of
queries (AVG. Q) needed to generate an adversarial example over successful attacks.
Methods JPEG Compression [15] Randomization [37] Guided Denoiser [22]ASR AVG. Q ASR AVG. Q ASR AVG. Q
NES [18] 47.3% 3114 23.2% 3632 48.0% 3633
SPSA [36] 40.0% 2744 9.6% 3256 46.0% 3526
RGF 41.5% 3126 19.5% 3259 50.3% 3569
P-RGF 61.4% 2419 60.4% 2153 51.4% 2858
RGFD 70.4% 2828 54.9% 2819 83.7% 2230
P-RGFD 81.1% 2120 82.3% 1816 89.6% 1784
methods, we set the number of queries as q = 50, and the sampling variance as σ = 0.0001 ·√D. We
also incorporate the data-dependent prior into these three methods for comparison (which are denoted
by adding a subscript “D”). We set the dimension of the subspace as d = 50× 50× 3. Besides, our
method is compared with the state-of-the-art attack methods, including the natural evolution strategy
(NES) [18], bandit optimization methods (BanditsT and BanditsTD) [19], and AutoZoom [35]. For
all methods, we restrict the maximum number of queries for each image to be 10,000. We report a
successful attack if a method can generate an adversarial example within 10,000 queries and the size
of perturbation is smaller than the budget (i.e.,  =
√
0.001 ·D).
We show the success rate of black-box attacks and the average number of queries needed to generate
an adversarial example over the successful attacks in Table 1. It can be seen that our method generally
leads to higher attack success rates and requires much fewer queries than other methods. Using a
fixed λ cannot give a satisfactory result, which demonstrates the necessity of using the optimal λ
in our method. The results also show that the data-dependent prior is orthogonal to the proposed
transfer-based prior, since integrating the data-dependent prior leads to better results. We show an
example of attacks in Fig. 1(a). Fig. 2 shows the average number of queries over successful images
by reaching a desired success rate. Our method is much more query-efficient than baseline methods.
4.3 Results of black-box attacks on defensive models
We further validate the effectiveness of the proposed method on attacking several defensive models,
including JPEG compression [15], randomization [37], and guided denoiser [22]. We utilize the
Inception-v3 model as the backbone classifier for the JPEG compression and randomization defenses.
We compare P-RGF with RGF, NES [18], and SPSA [36]. The experimental settings are the same
with those of attacking the normal models in Sec. 4.2. In our method, we use a smoothed version of
the transfer gradient [8] as the transfer-based prior for black-box attacks, since the smoothed transfer
gradient is better to defeat defensive models. The results in Table 2 also demonstrate the superiority
of our method for attacking the defensive models. Our method leads to much higher attack success
rates than other methods (20% ∼ 40% improvements in many cases), and also reduces the query
complexity.
5 Conclusion
In this paper, we proposed a prior-guided random gradient-free (P-RGF) method to utilize the transfer-
based prior for improving black-box adversarial attacks. Our method appropriately integrated the
transfer gradient of a surrogate white-box model by the derived optimal coefficient. The experimental
results consistently demonstrate the effectiveness of our method, which requires much fewer queries
to attack black-box models with higher success rates.
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A Proofs
We provide the proofs in this section.
A.1 Proof of Theorem 1
Theorem 1. If f is differentiable at x, the loss of the RGF estimator gˆ is
lim
σ→0
L(gˆ) = ‖∇f(x)‖22 −
(∇f(x)>C∇f(x))2
(1− 1q )∇f(x)>C2∇f(x) + 1q∇f(x)>C∇f(x)
,
where σ is the sampling variance, C = E[uiu>i ] with ui being the random vector, ‖ui‖2 = 1, and q
is the number of random vectors as in Eq. (5).
Remark 1. Rigorously speaking, we assume∇f(x)>C∇f(x) 6= 0 in the statement of the theorem
(and also in the proof), since when ∇f(x)>C∇f(x) 6= 0, both the numerator and the denominator
of the fraction above are zero. When ∇f(x)>C∇f(x) = 0, u>i ∇f(x) = 0 holds almost surely,
which implies that L(gˆ) = ‖∇f(x)‖2 regardless of the value of σ. In fact, this case will not happen
almost surely. In the setting of black-box attacks, we cannot even design a C with trace 1 such that
∇f(x)>C∇f(x) = 0 since ∇f(x) is unknown.
Proof. First, we derive L(gˆ) based on the assumption that the single estimate gˆi in Eq. (5) is equal to
u>i ∇f(x) · ui, which will hold when f is locally linear.
Lemma 1. Assume that the single estimate gˆi in Eq. (5) is equal to u>i ∇f(x) · ui. We have
L(gˆ) = ‖∇f(x)‖22 −
(∇f(x)>C∇f(x))2
(1− 1q )∇f(x)>C2∇f(x) + 1q∇f(x)>C∇f(x)
. (A.1)
Proof. First, we have
E‖∇f(x)− bgˆ‖22 = ‖∇f(x)‖22 − 2b∇f(x)>E[gˆ] + b2E‖gˆ‖22.
We have∇f(x)>E[gˆ] = ∇f(x)>E[gˆi] = E[∇f(x)>uiu>i ∇f(x)] = E[(∇f(x)>ui)2] ≥ 0. Hence
L(gˆ) = min
b≥0
E‖∇f(x)− bgˆ‖22 = min
b
E‖∇f(x)− bgˆ‖22 = ‖∇f(x)‖22 −
(∇f(x)>E[gˆ])2
E‖gˆ‖22
. (A.2)
Since gˆi = u>i ∇f(x) · ui, and u>i ui ≡ 1, we have
E[gˆi] = C∇f(x),
E‖gˆi‖22 = E[gˆ>i gˆi]
= E[∇f(x)>uiu>i uiu>i ∇f(x)]
= ∇f(x)>E[ui(u>i ui)u>i ]∇f(x)
= ∇f(x)>E[uiu>i ]∇f(x)
= ∇f(x)>C∇f(x).
Given E[gˆi] and E‖gˆi‖2, the corresponding moments of gˆ can be computed as
E[gˆ] = E[gˆi] (A.3)
= C∇f(x),
E‖gˆ‖22 = E‖gˆ − E[gˆ]‖22 + ‖E[gˆ]‖22
=
1
q
E‖gˆi − E[gˆi]‖22 + ‖E[gˆi]‖22
=
1
q
E‖gˆi‖22 + (1−
1
q
)‖E[gˆi]‖22 (A.4)
= (1− 1
q
)∇f(x)>C2∇f(x) + 1
q
∇f(x)>C∇f(x).
Plug them into Eq. (A.2) and we complete the proof.
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Next, we prove that if f is not locally linear, as long as it is differentiable at x, then by picking a
sufficient small σ, the loss tends to be that of the local linear approximation.
Lemma 2. If f is differentiable at x, letting L0 denote the right-hand side of Eq. (A.1), then we have
lim
σ→0
L(gˆ) = L0.
Proof. Let gˆ′i = u
>
i ∇f(x) · ui, gˆ′ = 1q
∑q
i=1 gˆ
′
i. Then L0 = L(gˆ
′). By Eq. (A.2), Eq. (A.3) and
Eq. (A.4), it suffices to prove limσ→0 E[gˆi] = E[gˆ′i] and limσ→0 E‖gˆi‖22 = E‖gˆ′i‖22.
For clarity, we redefine the notation: We omit the subscript i, make the dependence of gˆi on σ explicit
(let gˆσ denote gˆi), and let gˆ0 denote gˆ′i. Then we omit the hat in gˆ. That is, let g0 , u>∇f(x) · u and
gσ , f(x+σu)−f(x)σ · u, where u is sampled uniformly from the unit hypersphere. Then we want to
prove limσ→0 E[gσ] = E[g0] and limσ→0 E‖gσ‖22 = E‖g0‖22.
Since f is differentiable at x, we have
lim
σ→0
sup
‖u‖2=1
∣∣∣f(x+ σu)− f(x)
σ
− u>∇f(x)
∣∣∣ = 0. (A.5)
Since ‖u‖2 ≡ 1, we have
lim
σ→0
E‖gσ − g0‖2 ≤ lim
σ→0
sup
‖u‖2=1
∣∣∣f(x+ σu)− f(x)
σ
− u>∇f(x)
∣∣∣ = 0,
lim
σ→0
E‖gσ − g0‖22 ≤ lim
σ→0
sup
‖u‖2=1
∣∣f(x+ σu)− f(x)
σ
− u>∇f(x)∣∣2 = 0.
Applying Jensen’s inequality to convex function ‖ · ‖2, we have ‖E[gσ]− E[g0]‖2 ≤ E‖gσ − g0‖2.
Since limσ→0 E‖gσ − g0‖2 = 0, we have limσ→0 E[gσ] = E[g0].
Since
∣∣‖gσ‖2 − ‖g0‖2∣∣ ≤ ‖gσ − g0‖2, limσ→0 E‖gσ − g0‖2 = 0 and limσ→0 E‖gσ − g0‖22 = 0,
we have limσ→0 E
∣∣‖gσ‖2 − ‖g0‖2∣∣ = 0 and limσ→0 E(‖gσ‖2 − ‖g0‖2)2 = 0. Also, we have
‖g0‖2 ≤ ‖∇f(x)‖2. Hence, we have
lim
σ→0
∣∣E‖gσ‖22 − E‖g0‖22∣∣ ≤ lim
σ→0
E
∣∣‖gσ‖22 − ‖g0‖22∣∣
= lim
σ→0
E
[∣∣‖gσ‖2 − ‖g0‖2∣∣(‖gσ‖2 + ‖g0‖2)]
≤ lim
σ→0
E
[(‖gσ‖2 − ‖g0‖2)2 + 2‖g0‖2∣∣‖gσ‖2 − ‖g0‖2∣∣]
≤ lim
σ→0
E
[(‖gσ‖2 − ‖g0‖2)2 + 2‖∇f(x)‖2∣∣‖gσ‖2 − ‖g0‖2∣∣]
= 0.
The proof is complete.
By combining the two lemmas above, our proof for the theorem is complete.
A.2 Proof of Eq. (11)
Suppose v is a fixed random vector and ‖v‖2 = 1. Let the D-dimensional random vector u be
u =
√
λ · v +√1− λ · (I− vv>)ξ,
where ξ is sampled uniformly from the unit hypersphere. We want to prove that
E[uu>] = λvv> +
1− λ
D − 1(I− vv
>).
Proof. Let r , (I− vv>)ξ. We choose an orthonormal basis {v1, ..., vD} of RD such that v1 = v.
Then ξ can be written as ξ =
∑D
i=1 aivi, where a = (a1, ..., aD)
> is sampled uniformly from the
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unit hypersphere. Hence (I − vv>)ξ = ∑Di=2 aivi, and r = ∑Di=2 aivi√∑D
i=2 a
2
i
. Let bi = ai√∑D
i=2 a
2
i
for
i = 2, 3, ..., D, then b = (b2, b3, ..., bD)> is sampled uniformly from the (D − 1)-dimensional unit
hypersphere, and r =
∑D
i=2 bivi. Hence E[r] = 0. To compute E[rr>], we need a lemma first.
Lemma 3. Suppose d is a positive integer, u =
∑d
i=1 aivi where a = (a1, ..., ad)
> is sampled
uniformly from the d-dimensional unit hypersphere, then E[uu>] = 1d
∑d
i=1 viv
>
i .
Proof. E[uu>] = E[(
∑d
i=1 aivi)(
∑d
j=1 ajv
>
j )] =
∑d
i=1
∑d
j=1 viv
>
j E[aiaj ]. By symmetry, we
have E[aiaj ] = 0 when i 6= j, and E[a2i ] = E[a2j ] for any i, j. Since
∑d
i=1 a
2
i = 1, we have
E[a2i ] = 1d for any i. Hence E[uu
>] = 1d
∑d
i=1 viv
>
i .
Using the lemma, we have E[rr>] = 1D−1
∑D
i=2 viv
>
i =
1
D−1 (I− vv>). Since E[r] = 0, we have
E[vr>] = E[rv>] = 0. Hence, we have
E[uu>] = E[(
√
λ · v +√1− λ · r)(
√
λ · v +√1− λ · r)>]
= λvv> + (1− λ)E[rr>]
= λvv> +
1− λ
D − 1(I− vv
>).
The proof is complete.
Remark 2. The construction of the random vector u such that E[uu>] = λvv> + 1−λD−1 (I− vv>) is
not unique. One can choose a different kind of distribution or simply take the negative of u while
remaining E[uu>] invariant.
A.3 Proof of Eq. (12)
Let α = v>∇f(x). Suppose D ≥ 2, q ≥ 1. After plugging Eq. (10) into Eq. (9), the optimal λ is
given by
λ∗ =

0 if α2 ≤ 1
D + 2q − 2
(1− α2)(α2(D + 2q − 2)− 1)
2α2Dq − α4D(D + 2q − 2)− 1 if
1
D + 2q − 2 < α
2 <
2q − 1
D + 2q − 2
1 if α2 ≥ 2q − 1
D + 2q − 2
. (A.6)
Proof. After plugging Eq. (10) into Eq. (9), we have
L(λ) = ‖∇f(x)‖22
(
1− (λα
2 + 1−λD−1 (1− α2))2
(1− 1q )(λ2α2 + ( 1−λD−1 )2(1− α2)) + 1q (λα2 + 1−λD−1 (1− α2))
)
.
To minimize L(λ), we should maximize
F (λ) =
(λα2 + 1−λD−1 (1− α2))2
(1− 1q )(λ2α2 + ( 1−λD−1 )2(1− α2)) + 1q (λα2 + 1−λD−1 (1− α2))
. (A.7)
Note that F (λ) is a quadratic rational function w.r.t. λ.
Since we optimize λ in a closed interval [0, 1], checking λ = 0, λ = 1 and the stationary points (such
that F ′(λ) = 0) would suffice. By solving F ′(λ) = 0, we have at most two solutions:
λ1 =
(1− α2)(α2(D + 2q − 2)− 1)
2α2Dq − α4D(D + 2q − 2)− 1 , (A.8)
λ2 =
1− α2
1− α2D,
14
where λ1 or λ2 is the solution if and only if the denominator is not 0. Given α2 ≤ 1 and D ≥ 2,
λ2 /∈ (0, 1), so we only need to consider λ1.
First, we figure out when λ1 ∈ (0, 1). We can verify that λ1 = 1 when α2 = 0 and λ1 = 0 when
α2 = 1. Suppose α2 ∈ (0, 1). Let J denote the numerator in Eq. (A.8) andK denote the denominator.
We have that when α2 > 1D+2q−2 , J > 0; else, J ≤ 0. We also have that when α2 < 2q−1D+2q−2 ,
J < K; else, J ≥ K. Note that J/K ∈ (0, 1) if and only if 0 < J < K or 0 > J > K. Hence,
λ1 ∈ (0, 1) if and only if 1D+2q−2 < α2 < 2q−1D+2q−2 .
Case 1: λ1 /∈ (0, 1). Then it suffices to compare F (0) with F (1). We have
F (0) =
(1− α2)q
D + q − 2 , F (1) = α
2.
Hence, F (0) ≥ F (1) if and only if α2 ≤ qD+2q−2 . It means that if α2 ≥ 2q−1D+2q−2 , then λ∗ = 1; if
α2 ≤ 1D+2q−2 , then λ∗ = 0.
Case 2: λ1 ∈ (0, 1). After plugging Eq. (A.8) into Eq. (A.7), we have
F (λ1) =
4α2(1− α2)(q − 1)q
−1 + 2α2(D(2q − 1) + 2(q − 1)2)− α4(D + 2q − 2)2 . (A.9)
Now we prove that F (λ1) ≥ F (0) and F (λ1) ≥ F (1). Since when 0 < λ < 1, both the numerator
and the denominator in Eq. (A.7) is positive, we have F (λ) > 0, ∀λ ∈ (0, 1). Since the numerator
in Eq. (A.9) is non-negative and F (λ1) > 0, we know that the denominator in Eq. (A.9) is positive.
Hence, we have
F (λ1)− F (0) = q(1− α
2)(α2(D + 2q − 2)− 1)2
(q +D − 2)(−1 + 2α2(D(2q − 1) + 2(q − 1)2)− α4(D + 2q − 2)2) > 0;
F (λ1)− F (1) = α
2(α2(D + 2q − 2) + 1− 2q)2
−1 + 2α2(D(2q − 1) + 2(q − 1)2)− α4(D + 2q − 2)2 > 0.
Hence in this case λ∗ = λ1.
The proof is complete.
A.4 Monotonicity of λ∗
We will prove that λ∗ is a monotonically increasing function of α2, and a monotonically decreasing
function of q (when α2 > 1D ).
Proof. To find the monotonicity w.r.t. α2, note that λ∗ = 0 if α2 ≤ 1D+2q−2 and λ∗ = 1 when
α2 ≥ 2q−1D+2q−2 . When 1D+2q−2 < α2 < 2q−1D+2q−2 , we have
λ∗ =
(1− α2)(α2(D + 2q − 2)− 1)
2α2Dq − α4D(D + 2q − 2)− 1
=
α4(D + 2q − 2)− α2(D + 2q − 1) + 1
α4D(D + 2q − 2)− 2α2Dq + 1
=
1
D
(
1− (α
2D − 1)(D − 1)
α4D(D + 2q − 2)− 2α2Dq + 1
)
(A.10)
=
1
D
− D − 1
α2D(D + 2q − 2)− (2Dq −D − 2q + 2)− 2 (D−1)(q−1)α2D−1
.
When α2 < 1D , or when α
2 > 1D , a larger α
2 leads to larger values of both α2D(D + 2q − 2)
and −2 (D−1)(q−1)α2D−1 , and consequently leads to a larger λ∗. Meanwhile, by the argument in the
proof of Eq. (12), when 1D+2q−2 < α
2 < 2q−1D+2q−2 , the denominator of Eq. (A.8) is positive, hence
α4D(D + 2q − 2) − 2α2Dq + 1 < 0. By Eq. (A.10), when α2 < 1D , λ∗ < 1D ; when α2 = 1D ,
λ∗ = 1D ; when α
2 > 1D , λ
∗ > 1D . We conclude that λ
∗ is a monotonically increasing function of α2.
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To find the monotonicity w.r.t q when α2 > 1D , Eq. (A.6) tells us that when q ≤ α
2(D−2)+1
2(1−α2) , λ
∗ = 1;
else, 0 < λ∗ < 1. In the latter case, we rewrite Eq. (A.10) as
λ∗ =
1
D
(
1 +
(α2D − 1)(D − 1)
2α2D(1− α2)q − α4D(D − 2)− 1
)
.
We have (α2D− 1)(D− 1) > 0, and as explained before, the denominator is positive for any q such
that 0 < λ∗ < 1. Hence, when α2 > 1D , λ
∗ is a monotonically decreasing function of q.
A.5 Proof of Eq. (18)
Let α = v>∇f(x), A2 = ∑di=1(v>i ∇f(x))2. Suppose d ≥ 1, q ≥ 1. After plugging Eq. (17) into
Eq. (9), the optimal λ is given by
λ∗ =

0 if α2 <
A2
d+ 2q − 2
A2(A2 − α2(d+ 2q − 2))
A4 + α4d2 − 2A2α2(q + dq − 1) if
A2
d+ 2q − 2 ≤ α
2 <
A2(2q − 1)
d
1 if α2 ≥ A
2(2q − 1)
d
.
Proof. The proof is very similar to that in Sec. A.3. After plugging Eq. (17) into Eq. (9), we have
L(λ) = ‖∇f(x)‖22
(
1− (λα
2 + 1−λd A
2)2
(1− 1q )(λ2α2 + ( 1−λd )2A2) + 1q (λα2 + 1−λd A2)
)
.
To minimize L(λ), we should maximize
F (λ) =
(λα2 + 1−λd A
2)2
(1− 1q )(λ2α2 + ( 1−λd )2A2) + 1q (λα2 + 1−λd A2)
. (A.11)
Note that F (λ) is a quadratic rational function w.r.t. λ.
Since we optimize λ in a closed interval [0, 1], checking λ = 0, λ = 1 and the stationary points (i.e.,
F ′(λ) = 0) would suffice. By solving F ′(λ) = 0, we have at most two solutions:
λ1 =
A2(α2(d+ 2q − 2)−A2)
2A2α2(dq + q − 1)− α4d2 −A4 , (A.12)
λ2 =
A2
A2 − α2d ,
where λ1 or λ2 is the solution if and only if the denominator is not 0. λ2 /∈ (0, 1), so we only need to
consider λ1.
First, we figure out when λ1 ∈ (0, 1). We can verify that λ1 = 1 when α2 = 0 and λ1 = 0 when
A2 = 0. Suppose α2 6= 0 and A2 6= 0. Let J denote the numerator in Eq. (A.12) and K denote
the denominator. We have that when α2 > A
2
d+2q−2 , J > 0; else, J ≤ 0. We also have that when
α2 < A
2(2q−1)
d , J < K; else, J ≥ K. Note that J/K ∈ (0, 1) if and only if 0 < J < K or
0 > J > K. Hence, λ1 ∈ (0, 1) if and only if A2d+2q−2 < α2 < A
2(2q−1)
d .
Case 1: λ1 /∈ (0, 1). Then it suffices to compare F (0) and F (1). We have
F (0) =
A2q
d+ q − 1 , F (1) = α
2.
Hence, F (0) ≥ F (1) if and only if α2 ≤ A2qd+q−1 . It means that if α2 ≥ A
2(2q−1)
d , then λ
∗ = 1; if
α2 ≤ A2d+2q−2 , then λ∗ = 0.
Case 2: λ1 ∈ (0, 1). After plugging Eq. (A.12) into Eq. (A.11), we have
F (λ1) =
4A2α2(A2 + α2)(q − 1)q
2A2α2(2q(d+ q − 1)− d)− α4d2 −A4 . (A.13)
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Now we prove that F (λ1) ≥ F (0) and F (λ1) ≥ F (1). Since when 0 < λ < 1, both the numerator
and the denominator in Eq. (A.11) is positive, we have F (λ) > 0, ∀λ ∈ (0, 1). Since the numerator
in Eq. (A.13) is non-negative, and F (λ1) > 0, we know that the denominator in Eq. (A.13) is positive.
Hence, we have
F (λ1)− F (0) = qA
2(α2(d+ 2q − 2)−A2)2
(q + d− 1)(2A2α2(2q(d+ q − 1)− d)− α4d2 −A4) > 0;
F (λ1)− F (1) = α
2(α2d+A2(1− 2q))2
2A2α2(2q(d+ q − 1)− d)− α4d2 −A4 > 0.
Hence in this case λ∗ = λ1.
The proof is complete.
A.6 Explanation on Eq. (19)
We explain why the construction of ui in Eq. (19) makes E[uiu>i ] a good approximation of C.
Recall the setting: In RD, we have a normalized transfer gradient v, and a specified d-dimensional
subspace with {v1, ..., vd} as its orthonormal basis. Let C = λvv> + 1−λd
∑d
i=1 viv
>
i . Here we
argue that if u =
√
λ · v +√1− λ · (I− vv>)Vξ, then E[uu>] ≈ C.
Let r , (I− vv>)Vξ. The reason why E[uu>] 6= C is that E[rr>] 6= 1d
∑d
i=1 viv
>
i when v is not
orthogonal to the subspace spanned by {v1, ..., vd}. However, by symmetry, we still have E[r] = 0.
To get an expression of E[rr>], we let vT denotes the projection of v onto the subspace, and let
v1 = vT so that v2, ..., vd are orthonormal to vT (hence also orthonormal to v). We temporarily
assume vT 6= v and vT 6= 0. Now let v′1 = (I− vv>)vT = vT − v>vT · v, then {v′1, v2, ..., vd}
form an orthonormal basis of the subspace in which r lies, and v is orthogonal to this modified
subspace. Now we have E[rr>] = λ1v′1v′>1 + 1−λ1d−1
∑d
i=2 viv
>
i where λ1 is a number in [0,
1
d ]. (Note
that when v = vT , although v′1 cannot be defined, we have λ1 = 0. When vT = 0, we can just set
v′1 = v1 and λ1 =
1
d .) When d is large, λ1 is small, so for approximation we can replace v
′
1 with v1;
|λ − 1d | is small, so for approximation we can set λ1 = 1d . Then we have E[rr>] ≈ 1d
∑d
i=1 viv
>
i .
Since E[r] = 0, we have E[uu>] = λvv> + (1− λ)E[rr>] ≈ λvv> + 1−λd
∑d
i=1 viv
>
i .
Remark 3. To avoid approximation, one can choose the subspace as spanned by {v′1, v2, ..., vd}
instead of {v1, v2, ..., vd} to ensure that v is orthogonal to the subspace. Then u can be sampled as
u =
√
λ · v +√1− λ ·V′ξ,
where V′ = [v′1, v2, ..., vd] and ξ is sampled uniformly from the d-dimensional unit hypersphere.
Note that here the optimal λ is calculated using A′2 = v′>1 ∇f(x) +
∑d
i=2(v
>
i ∇f(x))2. However, in
practice, it is not convenient to make the subspace dependent on v, and the computational complexity
is high to construct an orthonormal basis with one vector (v′1) specified.
B Gradient averaging method
In Sec. 3.2, we have presented the prior-guided random gradient-free (P-RGF) algorithm, where
we integrate the transfer gradient into the sampling distribution of ui. In this section, we propose
the gradient averaging algorithm as an alternative method to incorporate the transfer gradient. The
motivation is as follows. We observe that the RGF estimator in Eq. (5) is in the following form:
gˆ = 1q
∑q
i=1 gˆi, where multiple rough estimates are averaged. Indeed, the transfer gradient itself can
also be considered as an estimate of the true gradient, and then it is reasonable to adopt a weighted
average of the transfer gradient and the RGF estimator. Here, we choose the RGF estimator to be the
ordinary one (using ui sampled from uniform distribution) instead of the P-RGF estimator, to prevent
its direction from being too similar to the direction of the transfer gradient.
In summary, the gradient averaging method works as follows. We first get the RGF estimator
denoted by gˆU , given by Eq. (5) with the sampling distribution P being the uniform distribution; then
normalize the estimator; and finally average the normalized transfer gradient v and the normalized
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RGF estimator gˆU as
gˆ = µv + (1− µ)gˆU , (B.1)
where µ ∈ [0, 1] plays a similar role as λ in the proposed prior-guided RGF method. We also assume
α = v>∇f(x) ≥ 0. Under the gradient estimation problem, we also want to minimize L(gˆ) by
optimizing µ. First, we have the following theorem.
Theorem 2. Let β = ∇f(x)> 1q
∑q
i=1(u
>
i ∇f(x) · ui) be the cosine similarity between∇f(x) and
the ordinary RGF estimator w.r.t. a locally linear f . If f is differentiable at x, the loss of the gradient
estimator in Eq. (B.1) is
lim
σ→0
L(gˆ) = (1− (µα+ (1− µ)E[β])
2
µ2 + (1− µ)2 + 2µ(1− µ)αE[β] )‖∇f(x)‖
2
2. (B.2)
Proof. As in Eq. (5), gˆU = 1q
∑q
i=1 gˆ
U
i and gˆ
U
i =
f(x+σui)−f(x)
σ · ui. First, we derive L(gˆ) based
on the assumption that gˆUi is equal to u
>
i ∇f(x) · ui, which will hold when f is locally linear.
Lemma 4. Assume that gˆU = 1q
∑q
i=1(u
>
i ∇f(x) · ui) (then β = ∇f(x)
>
gˆU ). We have
L(gˆ) = (1− (µα+ (1− µ)E[β])
2
µ2 + (1− µ)2 + 2µ(1− µ)αE[β] )‖∇f(x)‖
2
2.
Proof. It can be verified3 that gˆU = 0 happens with probability 0, hence we restrict our consideration
to the set {gˆU 6= 0}, which does not affect our conclusion. Then gˆU is always well-defined.
The distribution of gˆU is symmetric around the direction of ∇f(x), and so is the distribution of
gˆU . Hence we can suppose that E[gˆU ] = k∇f(x). Since E[β] = ∇f(x)>E[gˆU ] = k, we have
E[gˆU ] = E[β]∇f(x).
Hence we have
∇f(x)>E[gˆU ] = ∇f(x)>E[β]∇f(x) = E[β]‖∇f(x)‖2,
and
v>E[gˆU ] = v>E[β]∇f(x) = αE[β].
Together with v>∇f(x) = α‖∇f(x)‖2 and noting that ‖v‖2 = 1, we have
E‖∇f(x)− bgˆ‖22 = E‖bµv + b(1− µ)gˆU −∇f(x)‖2
= b2µ2 + b2(1− µ)2 + ‖∇f(x)‖22 + 2b2µ(1− µ)v>E[gˆU ]
− 2bµα‖∇f(x)‖2 − 2b(1− µ)∇f(x)>E[gˆU ] (B.3)
= b2µ2 + b2(1− µ)2 + ‖∇f(x)‖22 + 2b2µ(1− µ)αE[β]
− 2bµα‖∇f(x)‖2 − 2b(1− µ)E[β]‖∇f(x)‖
= ((1− µ)2 + µ2 + 2µ(1− µ)αE[β])b2
− 2(αµ+ E[β](1− µ))‖∇f(x)‖2b+ ‖∇f(x)‖22.
Since ∇f(x)>gˆU = 1q
∑q
i=1(u
>
i ∇f(x))2 ≥ 0, then β ≥ 0, and hence E[β] ≥ 0. Then (1− µ)2 +
µ2 + 2µ(1 − µ)αE[β] > 0 and αµ + E[β](1 − µ) ≥ 0. Since L(gˆ) = minb≥0 E‖∇f(x) − bgˆ‖22,
optimize the objective w.r.t. b and we complete the proof.
Next, we prove that if f is not locally linear, as long as it is differentiable at x, then by picking
a sufficient small σ, the loss tends to be that of the local linear approximation. Here, we redefine
the notation as follows. We make the dependency of gˆU on σ explicit, i.e. we use gˆUσ to denote it.
Meanwhile, we define gˆU0 , 1q
∑q
i=1(u
>
i ∇f(x) · ui) as the RGF estimator under the local linear
approximation. We define gˆσ = µv + (1− µ)gˆUσ and gˆ0 = µv + (1− µ)gˆU0 . Then we have
3If gˆU = 0, ∇f(x)>gˆU = 1
q
∑q
i=1(u
>
i ∇f(x))2 = 0, hence u>i ∇f(x) = 0 for i = 1, 2, ..., q, whose
probability is 0.
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Lemma 5. If f is differentiable at x, then
lim
σ→0
L(gˆσ) = L(gˆ0)
Proof. By Eq. (B.3), it suffices to prove limσ→0 E[gˆUσ ] = E[gˆU0 ].
For any value of u1, u2, ..., uq , we have limσ→0 gˆUσ = gˆ
U
0 , i.e. gˆ
U
σ converges pointwise to gˆ
U
0 . Recall
that Pr(gˆU0 = 0) = 0, so we can restrict our consideration to the set {gˆU0 6= 0} which does not affect
our conclusion. Since x = x‖x‖2 is continuous everywhere in its domain, gˆ
U
σ converges pointwise to
gˆU0 . Since the family {gˆUσ } is uniformly bounded, by the dominated convergence theorem we have
limσ→0 E[gˆUσ ] = E[gˆU0 ].
By combining the two lemmas above, our proof for the theorem is complete.
We can calculate the closed-form solution of µ∗, the value of µ minimizing Eq. (B.2), as
µ∗ =
α(1− E[β]2)
(1− α2)E[β] + α(1− E[β]2) ≈
α
E[β] + α
. (B.4)
That is, the ratio of weights of v and gˆU is approximately the ratio of their (expected) inner product
with the true gradient.
Next, we discuss how to calculate E[β] = E[∇f(x)>gˆU0 ], where gˆU0 = 1q
∑q
i=1(u
>
i ∇f(x) · ui).
E[β] is independent of ‖∇f(x)‖2, and since ui is uniformly sampled from the unit hypersphere, E[β]
is also independent of the direction of∇f(x). Hence, E[β] is a constant given the dimension D and
the number of queries q, and we can estimate E[β] using numerical simulation methods.
However, here we give a framework for approximating E[β] in a closed-form formula. We notice that
the following approximation works well in practice, where gˆ = 1q
∑q
i=1(u
>
i ∇f(x) · ui):
E[β] = E[
√
β2]
≈
√
E[β2]
=
√
1− E[min
b
‖∇f(x)− bgˆ‖2]
=
√
1− 1‖∇f(x)‖22
E[min
b
‖∇f(x)− bgˆ‖2]
≈
√
1− 1‖∇f(x)‖22
min
b
E‖∇f(x)− bgˆ‖2
=
√
1− 1‖∇f(x)‖22
L(gˆ)2.
Here, the first equality is because ∇f(x)>gˆ = 1q
∑q
i=1(u
>
i ∇f(x))2 ≥ 0; the second equality
is because we have minb ‖∇f(x) − bgˆ‖2 = 1 − (∇f(x)>gˆ)2 = 1 − β2. Intuitively, the two
approximations work well because the variances of β and ‖gˆ‖2 are relatively small.
Now we define F (gˆ) = 1 − 1‖∇f(x)‖22L(gˆ)
2. Then we have E[β] ≈ √F (gˆ). Note that when ui is
sampled from the uniform distribution on the unit hypersphere, F (gˆ) is in fact F ( 1D ) in Eq. (A.7),
since gˆ is an RGF estimator w.r.t. locally linear f , and E[uiu>i ] = 1D I which corresponds to λ =
1
D
in Eq. (10). We can calculate F ( 1D ) =
q
D+q−1 . Hence, E[β] ≈
√
q
D+q−1 .
Calculating µ∗ using α ≥ 0 and E[β] ≈
√
q
D+q−1 > 0, we have µ
∗ < 1. This means we
always need to take q queries to get gˆU . However, when µ is close to 1, the improvement of using
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Algorithm 2 Gradient averaging method
Input: The black-box model f ; input x and label y; the normalized transfer gradient v; sampling variance σ;
number of queries q; input dimension D; threshold c.
Output: Estimate of the gradient∇f(x).
1: Estimate the cosine similarity α = v>∇f(x) (detailed in Sec. 3.3);
2: Approximate E[β] as
√
q
D+q−1 ;
3: Calculate µ∗ according to Eq. (B.4) given α and E[β];
4: if µ∗ ≥ c then
5: return v;
6: end if
7: gˆU ← 0;
8: for i = 1 to q do
9: Sample ui from the uniform distribution on the D-dimensional unit hypersphere;
10: gˆU ← gˆU + f(x+ σui, y)− f(x, y)
σ
· ui;
11: end for
12: return∇f(x)← µ∗v + (1− µ∗)gˆU .
gˆ = µ∗v + (1− µ∗)gˆU instead of directly using v as the estimate is marginal. To save queries, we
adopt a threshold c ∈ (0, 1). When µ∗ ≥ c, we let gˆ = v instead of letting gˆ = µ∗v + (1− µ∗)gˆU .
We summarize the gradient averaging method in Algorithm 2.
B.1 Incorporating the data-dependent prior
We can also incorporate the data-dependent prior introduced in Sec. 3.4 into the proposed gradient
averaging method. In this case, we get an ordinary subspace RGF estimate gˆS first4 (instead of an
ordinary RGF estimate); and then normalize it; and finally get the averaged estimator as
gˆ = µv + (1− µ)gˆS . (B.5)
We also assume α = v>∇f(x) ≥ 0. Here, we need to analyze some quantity about the subspace. We
define∇f(x)T = (
∑d
i=1 viv
>
i )∇f(x) is the projection of∇f(x) into the subspace corresponding to
the data-dependent prior, and A2 =
∑d
i=1(v
>
i ∇f(x))2 = ‖∇f(x)T ‖2. Then we have the following
loss function:
Theorem 3. Let β = ∇f(x)> 1q
∑q
i=1(u
>
i ∇f(x) · ui) be the cosine similarity between∇f(x) and
the ordinary subspace RGF estimator w.r.t. a locally linear f . (Note that here ui lies in the subspace.)
Furthermore, let α1 = v>∇f(x)T . If f is differentiable at x and A2 > 0, using gˆ defined in (B.5),
we have
lim
σ→0
L(gˆ) = (1− (µα+ (1− µ)E[β])
2
µ2 + (1− µ)2 + 2µ(1− µ) α1A2E[β]
)‖∇f(x)‖2. (B.6)
Proof. Similar to the proof of Theorem 2, we define gˆS0 =
1
q
∑q
i=1(u
>
i ∇f(x) · ui) =
1
q
∑q
i=1(u
>
i ∇f(x)T · ui), where ∇f(x)T = ‖∇f(x)‖2∇f(x)T denotes the projection of ∇f(x)
into the subspace. Then β = ∇f(x)>gˆS0 = ∇f(x)
>
T gˆ
S
0 . Since A
2 > 0, we have ∇f(x)T 6= 0,
hence as described in Footnote 3, we can prove Pr(gˆS0 = 0) = 0 similarly. Now we restrict our
consideration to the set {gˆS0 6= 0}. The distribution of gˆS0 is symmetric around the direction of
∇f(x)T , and so is the distribution of gˆS0 . Hence we can suppose that E[gˆS0 ] = k∇f(x)T . Since
E[β] = ∇f(x)>T E[gˆS0 ] = k‖∇f(x)T ‖22 = kA2, we have E[gˆS0 ] = E[β]A2 ∇f(x)T .
Note that
v>E[gˆS0 ] = v
>E[β]
A2
∇f(x)T =
α1
A2
E[β].
4An ordinary subspace RGF estimate refers to the RGF estimate in Eq. (5) with ui = Vξi, where ξi is
sampled uniformly from the d-dimensional unit hypersphere, V = [v1, v2, ..., vd], and {v1, v2, ..., vd} is an
orthonormal basis of a d-dimensional subspace. It corresponds to λ = 0 in Eq. (17).
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The rest of the proof is the same as that of Theorem 2.
The optimal solution of µ minimizing Eq. (B.6) is
µ∗ =
A2α− α1E[β]2
(A2 − α1E[β])(α+ E[β]) ≈
α
E[β] + α
. (B.7)
The approximation works mainly because A  E[β] (since E[β] ≈ A
√
q
d+q−1 as shown below).
Hence, the approximate solution is the same as in the case without using the data-dependent prior,
which does not depend on α1.
Similarly, we can approximate E[β] by E[β] ≈ √F (gˆ). When ui is sampled from the uniform
distribution on the unit hypersphere in the subspace, F (gˆ) is in fact F (0) in Eq. (A.11), since gˆ is an
RGF estimator w.r.t. locally linear f , and E[uiuTi ] = 1d
∑d
i=1 viv
>
i which corresponds to λ = 0 in
Eq. (17). We can calculate F (0) = A
2q
d+q−1 . Hence, E[β] ≈
√
A2q
d+q−1 .
Our gradient averaging algorithm with the data-dependent prior is similar to Algorithm 2. We first
estimate α and A, approximate E[β] as
√
A2q
d+q−1 , and then calculate µ
∗ by Eq. (B.7). If µ∗ ≥ c, we
use the transfer gradient v as the estimate. If not, we get the ordinary subspace RGF estimator gˆS ,
then use gˆ ← µ∗v + (1− µ∗)gˆS as the estimate.
C Estimation of A
Suppose that the subspace is spanned by a set of orthonormal vectors {v1, ..., vd}. Now we want to
estimate
A2 =
d∑
i=1
(v>i ∇f(x))2 =
∑d
i=1(v
>
i ∇f(x))2
‖∇f(x)‖22
=
‖h(x)‖22
‖∇f(x)‖22
,
where h(x) =
∑d
i=1 v
>
i ∇f(x) · vi is the projection of ∇f(x) to the subspace. We can estimate
‖∇f(x)‖22 using the method introduced in Sec. 3.3. Here, we introduce the method to estimate‖h(x)‖22.
Let w = Vξ where V = [v1, v2, ..., vd] and ξ is a random vector uniformly sampled from the
d-dimensional unit hypersphere. By Lemma 3, E[ww>] = 1d
∑d
i=1 viv
>
i . Suppose we have S i.i.d.
such samples of w denoted by w1, ..., wS , and we letW = [w1, ..., wS ].
With g(x1, ..., xS) = 1S
∑S
s=1 x
2
s, we have
g(W>∇f(x)) = g(W>h(x)) = ‖h(x)‖22 · g(W>h(x)).
Hence g(W
>∇f(x))
E[g(W>h(x))] is an unbiased estimator of ‖h(x)‖
2
2. Now, h(x) is in the subspace spanned
by {v1, ..., vd}, and w1 is uniformly distributed on the unit hypersphere of this subspace. Hence
E[(w>1 h(x))2] is independent of the direction of h(x) and can be computed. We have:
E[g(W>h(x))] = E[(w>1 h(x))2] = h(x)
>
E[w1w>1 ]h(x) = h(x)
> 1
d
d∑
i=1
viv
>
i h(x) =
1
d
.
Hence, we have the estimator ‖h(x)‖2 ≈
√
d
S
∑S
s=1(w
>
s ∇f(x))2, where ws = Vξs and ξs is
uniformly sampled from the unit hypersphere in Rd. Finally we can get an estimate of A by
A = ‖h(x)‖2‖∇f(x)‖2 .
D Additional experiments
We add the experimental results using the gradient averaging method, including a baseline method
which uses a fixed µ set to 0.5 or 0.05 and the algorithm using the optimal value µ∗ given by
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Table 3: The full experimental results of black-box attacks against Inception-v3, VGG-16, and ResNet-50 under
the `2 norm. We report the attack success rate (ASR) and the average number of queries (AVG. Q) needed to
generate an adversarial example over successful attacks.
Methods Inception-v3 VGG-16 ResNet-50ASR AVG. Q ASR AVG. Q ASR AVG. Q
NES [18] 95.5% 1718 98.7% 1081 98.4% 969
BanditsT [19] 92.4% 1560 94.0% 584 96.2% 1076
BanditsTD [19] 97.2% 874 94.9% 278 96.8% 512
AutoZoom [35] 85.4% 2443 96.2% 1589 94.8% 2065
RGF 97.7% 1309 99.8% 749 99.6% 673
P-RGF (λ = 0.5) 96.5% 1119 97.8% 710 98.7% 635
P-RGF (λ = 0.05) 97.8% 1021 99.7% 624 99.3% 511
P-RGF (λ∗) 98.1% 745 99.6% 331 99.6% 265
Averaging (µ = 0.5) 97.9% 958 99.8% 528 99.6% 485
Averaging (µ = 0.05) 97.8% 1260 99.8% 700 99.6% 619
Averaging (µ∗) 97.9% 735 99.7% 320 99.5% 250
RGFD 99.1% 910 100.0% 372 99.7% 429
P-RGFD (λ = 0.5) 98.2% 1047 99.7% 634 99.5% 552
P-RGFD (λ = 0.05) 99.1% 754 99.9% 359 99.8% 379
P-RGFD (λ∗) 99.1% 649 99.8% 250 99.6% 232
AveragingD (µ = 0.5) 99.3% 734 100.0% 332 99.7% 340
AveragingD (µ = 0.05) 99.0% 865 100.0% 360 99.7% 404
AveragingD (µ∗) 99.2% 644 99.7% 239 99.7% 240
Table 4: The full experimental results of black-box attacks against JPEG compression [15], randomization [37],
and guided denoiser [22] under the `2 norm. We report the attack success rate (ASR) and the average number of
queries (AVG. Q) needed to generate an adversarial example over successful attacks.
Methods JPEG Compression [15] Randomization [37] Guided Denoiser [22]ASR AVG. Q ASR AVG. Q ASR AVG. Q
NES [18] 47.3% 3114 23.2% 3632 48.0% 3633
SPSA [36] 40.0% 2744 9.6% 3256 46.0% 3526
RGF 41.5% 3126 19.5% 3259 50.3% 3569
P-RGF 61.4% 2419 60.4% 2153 51.4% 2858
Averaging 69.4% 2134 72.8% 1739 66.6% 2441
RGFD 70.4% 2828 54.9% 2819 83.7% 2230
P-RGFD 81.1% 2120 82.3% 1816 89.6% 1784
AveragingD 80.6% 2087 77.4% 1700 87.2% 1777
Eq. (B.4) (or by Eq. (B.7) in the case with the data-dependent prior). We set c = 1
1+
√
2
, and the other
hyperparameters are the same with those for the P-RGF method. Table 3 and Table 4 are the full
tables of experimental results based on the `2 norm.
We show the experimental results based on the `∞ norm in this section. We set the perturbation
budget as  = 0.05, the step size as η = 0.005 in the PGD method. Other hyperparameters are the
same with those for `2 attacks. Table 5 and Table 6 show the results for attacking the normal models
and the defensive models, respectively. Our method also leads to better results, which are consistent
with those based on the `2 norm.
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Table 5: The experimental results of black-box attacks against Inception-v3, VGG-16, and ResNet-50 under
the `∞ norm. We report the attack success rate (ASR) and the average number of queries (AVG. Q) needed to
generate an adversarial example over successful attacks.
Methods Inception-v3 VGG-16 ResNet-50ASR AVG. Q ASR AVG. Q ASR AVG. Q
NES [18] 87.5% 1850 95.6% 1477 94.5% 1405
BanditsT [19] 89.5% 1891 93.8% 585 95.2% 1199
BanditsTD [19] 94.7% 1099 95.1% 288 96.5% 651
RGF 94.4% 1565 98.8% 1064 99.4% 990
P-RGF (λ = 0.5) 85.4% 1578 92.2% 1180 95.1% 1046
P-RGF (λ = 0.05) 92.7% 1409 97.5% 1131 98.3% 891
P-RGF (λ∗) 93.8% 979 98.5% 635 99.0% 507
Averaging (µ = 0.5) 94.9% 1263 98.9% 851 99.2% 758
Averaging (µ = 0.05) 94.5% 1417 99.2% 1008 99.4% 869
Averaging (µ∗) 94.8% 974 98.5% 560 99.3% 490
RGFD 97.2% 1034 100.0% 502 99.7% 595
P-RGFD (λ = 0.5) 91.2% 1403 98.0% 1008 97.3% 852
P-RGFD (λ = 0.05) 97.7% 1005 99.9% 543 99.7% 598
P-RGFD (λ∗) 97.3% 812 99.7% 370 99.6% 388
AveragingD (µ = 0.5) 98.0% 898 100.0% 481 99.8% 504
AveragingD (µ = 0.05) 97.5% 930 100.0% 482 99.7% 548
AveragingD (µ∗) 98.4% 772 99.7% 374 99.6% 365
Table 6: The experimental results of black-box attacks against JPEG compression [15], randomization [37], and
guided denoiser [22] under the `∞ norm. We report the attack success rate (ASR) and the average number of
queries (AVG. Q) needed to generate an adversarial example over successful attacks.
Methods JPEG Compression [15] Randomization [37] Guided Denoiser [22]ASR AVG. Q ASR AVG. Q ASR AVG. Q
NES [18] 29.9% 2694 14.8% 3027 20.0% 3423
SPSA [36] 37.1% 2775 10.7% 2809 26.9% 3343
RGF 27.1% 2716 12.6% 3005 26.0% 3120
P-RGF 44.8% 2491 41.7% 2132 32.9% 2507
Averaging 51.8% 2138 51.9% 1813 38.7% 2251
RGFD 53.4% 2708 42.4% 2444 73.3% 2158
P-RGFD 64.0% 2189 66.9% 2108 76.0% 1799
AveragingD 64.0% 2141 58.3% 1753 77.6% 1889
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